Articles


Inter Alia


Volume 33 -- Fall, 2010 -- No. 1

ARTICLES

ANOTHER "STRAIGHTFORWARD APPLICATION":1 THE IMPACT OF MELENDEZ-DIAZ ON FORENSIC TESTING AND EXPERT TESTIMONY IN CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE CASES

JOHN WAIT
Page: 1

In 1991, Duane Deaver, a Special Agent with the North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation (“SBI”), performed a series of serology tests pertaining to the murder case of State of North Carolina v. Gregory Flint Taylor.2 Less sensitive presumptive tests confirmed the possible presence of blood on several areas of Greg Taylor’s vehicle;3 however, more sensitive confirmatory tests were negative.

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE TAX PROFESSIONAL GUIDING CLOSELY-HELD ENTITIES: 2009 & 2010 REGULATORY AND JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS IMPACTING FOURTH CIRCUIT TAX PRACTITIONERS

ROSE L. BAILEY
Page: 39

As tax practitioners are well aware, today’s world of Internal Revenue Code § 6694(a) preparer penalties1 and Circular 230 sanctions2 requires one to be well versed in tax pronouncement and tax litigation from various jurisdictions. In most cases, such penalties can be avoided where asserted tax positions are based on reasonable assumptions grounded in “substantial” primary authority.

TEXTUALIST CANONS: CABINING RULES OR PREDILECTIVE TOOLS

STEPHEN M. DURDEN
Page: 115

Justice Scalia proclaims homage to the “dead” Constitution.1 Justice Brennan honors the “living” Constitution.2 Others believe in “a partially living and partially dead Constitution.”3 But, whichever moniker selected, constitutional analysis remains (to the interpreter) personal; however, personal does not necessarily mean irrational or even singular (i.e., that no one else agrees with the interpretation). Rather, personal means that no matter how narrow the interpretational method, an interpreter of the Constitution inevitably makes personal choices when using any interpretational method - choices not required by, or perhaps even inconsistent with, the chosen interpretational method.

COMMENTS

CELL PHONE - A "WEAPON" OF MASS DISCRETION

Mark L. Mayakis
Page: 151

A dramatic increase in consumer demand for more feasible communication has influenced the advancement of convenient devices with powerful capabilities, such as third-generation cell phones.1 While the rapid development of modern cell phones has helped to satisfy this heightened demand, criminals have been similarly satisfied.2 Even subsequent to conviction, criminals have continued to utilize cell phones to carry out criminal activity.3 Recently, several courts have allowed law enforcement officials, acting without a warrant, to seize information stored within cellular phones in order to gather incriminating evidence and further their investigations against individuals suspected of criminal activity.4 Other courts, however, have not reached that same conclusion and have suppressed evidence seized from cell phones.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION FOR NONMEDIA DEFENDANTS: SHOULD THERE BE A DISTINCTION BETWEEN YOU AND LARRY KING?

Rebecca Phillips
Page: 173

On March 26, 2009, the notorious rocker and former lead singer of the band “Hole,” Courtney Love, was sued for libel by fashion designer Dawn Simorangkir after Love made “vile and defamatory” statements concerning Simorangkir on her Twitter account.2 While Love does not fit within the typical definition of “media,” these statements by Love claiming that Simorangkir is a “thief,” an “unfit parent, a racist and homophobe,” and a “danger to society” were circulated and read by “potentially millions of people” who could simply follow Love’s Twitter feed.3 Although this suit is still pending and it is unclear how the Superior Court of California will decide, this action is indicative of what the future may hold for internet users and the statements they make that are disseminated through social networking websites such as Twitter,4 MySpace,5 and Facebook.

BEYOND A DEFINITION: UNDERSTANDING THE NATURE OF VOID AND VOIDABLE CONTRACTS*

Jesse A. Schaefer
Page: 193

Contract law has a problem.1 With predictable recurrence, court opinions, statutes, scholarly literature, and contract draftsmen use the words “void,” “voidable,” and “unenforceable” – as well as dozens of other terms of the same ilk – to describe flawed contracts. Yet the meaning of these declarations is persistently and maddeningly slippery. In the rare case where the precise meanings of these words are pressed into service in the courtroom, litigants are often surprised to find the court announce that a transaction formerly (and unequivocally) declared to be void is, in fact, merely voidable or unenforceable.2 The scope of the problem is as widespread as it is trifled; though the distinction between void and voidable is sometimes the most important issue in contract disputes, very little serious, scholarly attention has been paid to the nature of the distinction.